STATEMENT BY THE BOARD OF THE LORD BYRON FOUNDATION

RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY AND THE CRISIS IN BOSNIA

          There is  growing international awareness that there will yet again be heavy fighting in former Yugoslavia.  The Contact Group has stopped negotiating with the Bosnian Serbs, and instead is relying on President Milosevic to compel them to submit to the present Diktat. The complementary objective is to gain time while building up the Muslim forces - reinforced by American and Islamic countries' arms and training - to try yet another offensive.

          There is a less bloody alternative, which the Bosnian Serbs have been offering all along - but the Contact Group and the world media have been quiet about. It is to accept the principle of self-determination as the basis for post-Yugoslav arrangements. Had the Contact Group produced a plan along these lines - such as the Geneva proposals of 1993 which Lord Owen and Dr. Stoltenberg negotiated and the Serbs accepted - there would be no need for pressure on the Bosnian Serb government.

          However, the Contact Group has no real peace plan.  There is merely a map, intentionally designed to be unacceptable to the Serbs.  Apart from the map there is an equally unacceptable outline of future constitutional arrangements on the basis of a unitary Bosnian state. Consent to a precise map was demanded of the Bosnian Serbs, while the constitutional dimension remains in limbo. The warring parties have been left to fix political arrangements after the plan is signed - with the suggestion that the Serbs might get a link with Serbia if the Muslims permit it! This is not a serious peace plan, but a blueprint for Serb surrender.    

          Russian foreign minister Kozyrev expected that Serbia's president Milosevic might well support the Contact Group, and was proven right. For reasons best known to themselves, Kozyrev and Milosevic support the German-American objective of causing divisions among the Serbs. The Russian foreign ministry consented to the American line of stopping negotiating in favour of putting heavy pressure on the Bosnian Serbs, rather than trying to craft a peace plan which addressed the core interests of all parties. Kozyrev knew that the 'plan' (as presented) would be rejected by the Bosnian Serbs, but accepted by Milosevic. The Americans want a victory over 'Serbian wrong-doers', and Kozyrev and Milosevic appear willing to help destroy the Serb political entities west of the Drina river. Both Kozyrev and Milosevic have given credence to the false assertion by the US that the only impediment to peace is the unwillingness of the Bosnian Serbs to accept a 49-51 split of the territory (an arbitrary figure anyway, which bears no relationship to the land ownership or ethnic distribution before the conflict).

          Washington has long encouraged the Bosnian Muslims to veto any Contact Group provision they dislike, but there is no sign that Clinton is prepared to put pressure on the Muslims to make any concessions to the Serbs.  Kozyrev must be aware that he has held out prospects to Milosevic (about the lifting of sanctions and a Serb-Serb federation) to which the Americans remain conspicuously opposed.    

          The notion that the Serbs will be made to accept the unacceptable through pressure alone is unrealistic. The only alternative to giving the Serbs a peace plan that meets their minimum requirements is to defeat them militarily. But the events surrounding the Muslim Bihac offensive  in October-November 1994 show that the Muslim government is not capable of defeating the Serbs by itself. Therefore, opting for the military solution automatically means widening of the war by the introduction of foreign forces, most likely NATO or American.

          Whatever view one takes of the start of the war, Radovan Karadzic is not, today, the principal obstacle to peace.  He has spent the past two years holding back a people's army - which might accept compromise about territory, but not about freedom and independence - from going for all-out military victory.  Contact Group brinkmanship has now put the Bosnian-Serb soldiers under enormous pressure to attack.  Kozyrev and the Americans appear to think that the Serbs can be fooled into waiting in the mountains until America and the Islamic world - embargo or no embargo - have completed the training and rearmament of the Muslim forces.    

          The Serbs have long chosen to refrain from offensive military action.  They wanted to send a clear signal to the international community that they prefer a negotiated outcome to this dispute. No one was listening. The Contact Group seems to prefer brinkmanship to the necessity of working out a viable settlement. The Serbs have no reason to doubt that by agreeing to the current Contact Group map they would give up their principles as well as their negotiating assets in return for nothing.

          Until the Contact Group modifies its map into something the Serbs can accept, and agrees to constitutional arrangements which recognize their right to self-determination, the Serbs will conclude that war offers them more than submission. President Karadzic is already saying this.  He is clearly anxious to negotiate an agreement, but he simply cannot accept a bad map and sign a blank cheque on future constitutional arrangements. Karadzic has often said 'no' when the undefeated Bosnian-Serb army wanted to settle the dispute by military means.  He soon may be obliged to say 'yes'. The only way to prevent this is to devise a new plan which guarantees the Bosnian Serbs sovereignty and a viable state based on an equitable division of territory and resources. This is in Russia's interest. The French and the British recognise this.  American diplomats resist it.  The Germans detest it. It is up to Russia to tilt the balance in the direction of peace and reason.

Moscow, 17 March 1995                        The Board

IN SERBIAN:

Saop{tewe Fondacije lorda Bajrona za balkanske studije

RUSKA DIPLOMATIJA I KRIZA U BIV[OJ JUGOSLAVIJI

          U svetu preovla|uje uverewe da uskoro predstoji razbuktavawe borbi na podru~ju biv{e Jugoslavije. Kontakt-grupa je prestala da razgovara sa Republikom Srpskom i umesto dijaloga uzda se da }e pritisak predsednika Milo{evi}a prinuditi Srbe zapadno od Drine da se povinuju wenom diktatu. Dodatni ciq Kontakt-grupe jeste da dobije na vremenu, dok neprestano ja~aju muslimanske snage zahvaquju}i prilivu naoru`awa i stru~ne obuke od strane SAD i islamskih zemaqa. Ohrabreni takvim razvojem, Muslimani ne kriju nameru da obnove ofanzivne akcije.

          Postoji mawe krvava alternativa novom rasplamsavawu rata, koju je Republika Srpska nudila od samog po~etka, ali koju pre}utkuju Kontakt-grupa i svetski mediji. To je da se napokon prihvati princip samoopredeqewa naroda biv{e Jugoslavije kao osnova svakog re{ewa. Da je Kontakt-grupa ponudila re{ewe na tim osnovama - kao {to je u~iweno sa Oven-Stoltenbergovim planom - ne bi bilo potrebe ni za kakvim pritiskom na Republiku Srpsku.

          Na`alost, ~iwenica je da Kontakt-grupa nema nikakav mirovni plan. Postoji samo jedna lo{e ura|ena mapa, svesno sra~unata da bude neprihvatqiva Srbima. Povrh toga postoji ni{ta prihvatqiviji obris ustavnog aran`mana, na osnovi jedinstvene bosanske dr`ave. Od Republike Srpske tra`eno je prihvatawe mape, a da pritom ustavni paket ne postoji. Nagove{tena je mogu}nost povezivawa RS sa Srbijom - pod uslovom da to bude prihvatqivo muslimanskoj strani! Dakle, nije re~ ni o kakvom planu, ve} o receptu za srpsku bezuslovnu kapitulaciju.

          Ruska diplomatija i politi~ki vrh u Beogradu, iz razloga najboqe znanim wima samima, podr`avaju nema~ki i ameri~ki ciq izazivawa razdora me|u Srbima. Rusko ministarstvo inostranih poslova (MID) prihvatilo je ameri~ki stav da se prekine svaki dijalog sa RS i da se na wu vr{i `estok pritisak, umesto da te`i iznala`ewu re{ewa koje bi uzelo u obzir bitne interese svih strana.

          Kozirjev je bio u pravu kada je politi~ke faktore u Moskvi pro{log leta uveravao da }e tzv. plan Kontakt-grupe prihvatiti zvani~ni Beograd. Me|utim, tim istim faktorima u Moskvi sve je jasnije da Kozirjev nije bio u pravu kada ih je dodatno uveravao u sposobnost Beograda da taj "plan" nametne zapadnim srpskim republikama. Svejedno, moskovski MID i zvani~ni Beograd uspeli su da daju kredibilitet la`noj ameri~koj tvrdwi  da je kqu~ problema u odbijawu RS da ispoqi razum i fleksibilnost.

          Va{ington odavno ohrabruje muslimansku stranu da stavqa veto na svaki predlog koji joj nije po voqi, a istovremeno ne pokazuje znake ma kakve spremnosti da SAD izvr{e pritisak na Izetbegovi}eve vlasti zarad mira. Istovremeno, odr`ava se fikcija da }e se Srbi prinuditi na neprihvatqivo putem pritisaka. ^iwenica je da jedina alternativa nekom mirovnom planu koji bi uzeo u obzir i srpske interese - jeste vojni~ki poraz Srba. Oko Biha}a novembra 1994. postalo je jasno da takav ishod nije mogu} bez strane vojne intervencije.

          Srbi mogu da prave kompromise oko mnogo ~ega, ali ne i oko prava na samoopredeqewe, oko svoje suverenosti. Oni su se dugo uzdr`avali od ofanzivnih akcija, i kada su mogli da ih izvode po voqi. Time su slali jasan signal me|unarodnoj zajednici da `ele re{ewe putem pregovora, ne ratom. Te signale su svetski mo}nici ignorisali. Kontakt-grupa je srpsku stranu prinudila da shvati da se od we tra`i odricawe i od principa i od teritorije - bez ikakve nadoknade, bukvalno niza{ta.

          Sve dok svet ne ponudi Srbima ne{to iole prihvatqivo, oni }e shvatati da im oru`ani otpor pru`a vi{e nade od predaje. Predsednik Karaxi} i ~itav narod RS `eli sporazum i mir, ali ne putem prihvatawa lo{e mape i blanko menice o ustavno-politi~kom sporazumu. Taj sporazum je u interesu Rusije - ne zarad Srba, ve} zarad same Rusije. Zahvaquju}i na{im susretima, ruska javnost, politi~ki i akademski krugovi sada su u ve}oj meri svesni te ~iwenice nego do pre deset dana. Uspostavqene kontakte produbqiva}emo, jer je u vakuumu konstruktivne ruske diplomatije neophodan kreativan, proaktivan doprinos Moskve u potrazi za mirom.

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