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Yugoslavian Crisis and Russian Public Consciousness Belov M. V. LBF-RAN, Moscow 1996
As it has
been repeatedly pointed out ideological ground of the line of “world community”
in Yugoslavian crisis, formation of the images of “enemies” and “friends” in the
Western consciousness on the Balkans has been conducted with rare mastery
basing on the experience of the “Cold War” times. An interest
to the events on the Balkans in Russia came into the surface quite soon and
immediately appeared connected with inner political crisis. Range of opinions
on the essence of Yugoslavian crisis and Russia’s role in it, spoken out by
Russian politicians, historians and journalists is a characteristic
manifestation of the contemporary Russian public consciousness. Analysis of
those opinions, evolution of public feelings could be interesting in the light
of possible changes in Russian foreign policy in the nearest future as well.
Not aspiring to exhausting observation of the problem, this introduction is
aimed at the depiction of the most important approaches to Yugoslavian crisis
and their basic premises. There can
be no doubt, that interpretation of the events on the Balkans is the main
frontier between Russian liberals and conservators, “democrats” and “patriots”,
Western and pro-Slavonic tendencies, though there is no simple entity in their
rows, and many points of view change often. The victory
of the left “democratic” Russia in August 1991 and actualization of its program
led to factual domination of its ideology, the fulcrum of which anti communism
has been. At the beginning the last one has been well considered in the society
prepared to it by the epoch of perestrojka.
From the point of view of anti communism there was going on the struggle
between the followers of the open society (Slovenians, Croatians, Bosnian
Muslims) and those of totalitarian communist dictatorship - the Serbs- on the
Balkans. In essence that was a copy of the Western system of information on
Yugoslavian crisis. Such a
simplified view on the Yugoslavian problems was domineering in the leading mass
media, but unavoidably had to be corrected in course of development of the
events and spread of new data. Moreover, the parallel process of the split of
the USSR, that has been met without protests but painfully, and that of SFRY
gave much to ponder over that. From the
other side, negative trends of the new state ideology were not obviously
sufficient for the legetimizaiton of the democratic power. The positive part of
the ideology of reforms and not be restricted by the simplified dull ideal of
the “Western way of life”. Society demanded recognition of the importance of
old Russian tradition and applied to pre-revolutionary experience of the
existence of the Russian state. Outwardly, “democratic” power was willing to
welcome public expectations, but in essence Russian State- political
tradition sharply contradicted to
liberal Western receipts of the social development. “Party of power” has not
settled this collision until now. As to the
events in Yugoslavia, determination of the role and importance of the
traditional economic, political and religious-cultural connections between
Serbia and Russia for contemporary Russian foreign policy caused great
arguments. If Slavophiles used them as main argument in favor of an active
support of the Serbs, Westerners sharply came out against “outlook that has its
ideal in the past and based on the historical myths, if not to say “clips” [I]. With that, Westerners went, first of all,
by the road of unmasking the “myth” of brotherly friendship of Russia and
Serbia and then- called upon the realism in the foreign policy. The most
explicit example of the exposures- is the version of the beginning of the First
World War. Say, Sergei Romanenko from the “Novyj Mir” (New World) magazine
states that when in 1912-1913, during the Balkans wars, Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Russia Sazonov denied to wage a war in defense of the Serb
territories,- the world was saved, and when Nicholas the Second wrote that he
could not be indifferent to the events on the Balkans- the war started. It
appears that namely Russia and Serbia were the culprits of the war [II]. Then
liberal authors alluding to today’s situation, usually remind that Russia had
to pay with revolution and Civil war for the help to the Serbs. We may
consider the use of the version of the Keiserist propaganda of the times of the
First World War by contemporary Russian liberals as a queer thing, caused by
the neglecting thoughtless approach to the historical past, by simplifications
and confusion of cause and effect. We might treat it ironically, but it
continues to be multiplied, forming public opinion. Talking on
political realism, earlier liberals said that coming out against Serbia, Russia
came out in defense of the principles of international law, because the Serbs
had roughly violated them. With the spread of the information on the violations
of the standards of the international law, elementary human rights of the Serbs
by the Croatians and Muslims, arguments of the liberals had to be changed. A
part of them has spoken out against “ naive proamericanism” of the Ministry of
the Foreign Affairs of A.Kozyrev, for a more balanced approach of Russia and
entire “world commonwealth” to the crisis in Yugoslavia. The logic of another
part took purely cynic trends. Russia has to come out against the Serbs, even
if they are not guilty more than other communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
because: a) the relations of partnership with the West are profitable for it
economically and politically; b) because Serbia is located in zone of Western
influence and support of Russia in any way will not be appreciated fully; c) on
the present stage Russia because of inner weakness must follow the policy of
isolationism (in the most radical variant in frames of “Moscow federal
principality”). But the most important of those interferences, profits of the
cooperation with the West was not reality in the eyes of the conservative
opposition, but new ideological illusion. Any way,
there appeared a fraction of the “realists”, interpreting the balance of power
and national interests of Russia on the Balkans totally differently, among the
conservators. This group, gathered by the magazine “Elements”, headed by A.
Dugin, built up its conclusions on the laws of geo-policy. If the majority of
the Slavophiles, looking at the conflict on the Balkans as on that of Orthodoxy
and Heresy, convicted the West in the tragedy of the Serbs and saw no clear
differences between Germany, Vatican and the USA, “Elements” proclaimed the
necessity of the joined patronage of two continental powers (Russia and
Germany) on the Balkans. They stated, that the conflict of continental powers
is useful just for the “Atlantism” (USA) and anti-Serb position of Germany- is
mistake that had to be corrected. But how concretely was it possible to be
done- was not clear [III]. An
important moment of the discussion on the crisis in Yugoslavia in Russian
society is its importance for the self-identification for the national values
and definition of the ways of development of Russia. Possibly, there is no one
article or statement, where the reference to the analogy of the post
communist destiny of the USSR and
“small Union”- SFRY was absent. And moreover, a point of view repeatedly has
been spoken out that “the West works out the methods of settlement of the
conflicts that disturb it” on the territory of Yugoslavia. And first of all- on
the territory of the former USSR. Serbia is a
negative example for Russia for the liberal-westerners, tragedy of Serbia is a
variant of development of Russia, that expects it, if the forces of the
“communist revenge” take over. On the contrary, patriots-Slavophiles saw an
example in Serbia that must be followed. “Serbia saves Russia” [5]. “ If Serbia
could not stand upon the pressure of the world capital, the next blow will be
delivered on us- Russia. But will we escape by ourselves? [6] “How many years
we suffered and still go on suffering, with really frightening obedience, the
actions aimed at the elimination of the Russians as a nation ... look at small
Serb people, learn patriotism from it, rally as the Serbs could do that, though
their way was not easy. Russians, become like the Serbs” [7]. As we might
see, liberals and conservators have just different values, the approach
properly is quite the same: Serbia is the pattern of self-identification of
Russia, positive or negative variant of its development. Discussion
of the causes and essence of the Yugoslavian and position of Russia in it
demonstrated deep split in contemporary Russian public consciousness.
Discussion connected tight with the arguments on the ways of Russia’s
development, was not sharp just in its form, but often acquired the character
of scandal. The voices of those who called to the balanced and multilateral
analysis were too weak. Even the observers who counted themselves pragmatic
realists, followed as a rule determined conceptional scheme (economic
determinism, geo-policy and so on) This as
well as weak awareness about the past and present of the Slavonic peoples,
historical nihilism, common political apathy, and “business” with inner Russian
problems, in our opinion, have not let public opinion influence on the line of
Russian diplomacy in the crisis in Yugoslavia actively and in proper time. REFERENCES 1. Cit. from: Yugoslavskij krizis v Rossii (Yugoslavian
Crisis in Russia) M. 1993, P. 424. 2. Novoje vremja (New Time), 1995, N5, P. 31 3. Elementy (Elements), 1992, N2, P. 16-25. 4. Cit. from:
Yugoslavskij krizis (Yugoslavian Crisis ), P. 462-463. 5. Russkij vestnik (Russian Messenger), 1993, N27, P. 7. 6. Nash Sovremennik (Our Contemporary), 1992, N11, P. 131. 7. Russkij vestnik (Russian Messenger), 1993, N29-30, P. 7. Back to Moscow Conference Back to Home Page
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