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CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN THE BALKANS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA Dr. Yelena GUSSKOVA Russian Academy of Science, Moscow 1997 Numerous
organizations and institutions have made their contribution to the search for a
lasting settlement of the Balkan conflict in the past five years. The
well-established household names were there from the early days, such as the
United Nations (UN), the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
(CSCE) and the European Union (EU); and several new ones subsequently made
their appearance - the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY),
the big and small contact groups, commissions and committees. Many of the
foreign ministers of European countries and the United States have spent much
time on the Yugoslav problem by taking part in talks with their colleagues and
the warring parties, visiting Zagreb, Belgrade and Sarajevo, drawing up ever
new plans and drafting countless documents. The
Big Seven and NATO also dealt with the Balkan problems at their respective
meetings, although such subjects were supposedly outside the proper sphere of
their activity. And quite different methods were used in the process - from
negotiations, ingratiations and ultimatums to the use of brute force. Now
that the crisis is in its sixth year one is led to conclude that, invariably,
those organizations' efforts have not yielded desired results. Not one of these
international organizations was successful in putting an end to the war:
neither the European Union - which seemed very close to attaining that goal in
1992 - nor the UN, which had a good chance of doing so in 1994. Even less
successful was the CSCE, whose statutory mission was to seek settlement of
European crises. If we look at the dynamics of the conflict, it will be clear
that as a result of the tempestuous activity of the international organizations
the crisis had only deepened and widening. Then the natural question arises:
why? Let us start by postulating the following two factors. 1. The Factor of Interests. Had all those
international organizations truly wished to resolve the nascent crisis in the
Balkans, there is little doubt that they could have done so any time starting
in mid-1991. It is remarkable, however, that in their search for a solution
those august bodies proceeded from the interests
of the countries they represented - or by whom they were dominated - rather
than the interests of the people of former Yugoslavia themselves. 2.
The Factor of Methods. The negotiation process in Bosnia looked much
like multi-layered cake consisting of various negotiating groups: the ICFY was
trying to convince the conflicting parties to adopt numerous plans of
settlement; the UNO was also separately engaged in the negotiation process
through the efforts of the personal representative of the UN Secretary-Gerneral, Yasushi Akashi; the Contact Groups
(big and small), formed ad hoc, were
also weaving their web of negotiations, and engaging for this purpose various
foreign ministers or their representatives. Sometimes those processes were intertwined, often
they got into each other's way and only on rare occasions they were fruitfully
coordinated. And although all of them claimed to be striving to attain peace,
they were fatally flawed: endless violations of the law of nations, disregard
for the realities of history, brazen lack of objectivity and the escalating
anti-Serb stand - adopted ever since the outbreak of the crisis - could hardly
contribute to the true settlement of the conflict. On the subject of interests, it was two
countries - Germany and the United States - which have played the main
destabilizing role in the Balkan crisis. Germany has acted as a catalyst in the
conflict situation in Yugoslavia from the outset, as was initially apparent in
its pressure on its European partners to extend hasty, premature and
ill-advised recognition to the secessionist Yugoslav republics. Not unlike some
other European countries, only more brazenly so, Germany made use if the Balkan
conflict to attain its national goals. The unified Germany seeks leadership of
‘Europe,’ no longer only in the sphere of economy, but also in politics.
However, it had to overcome the barriers to its new ambitions, barriers which
had resulted from the postwar European security system. For this reason Germany seeks to obtain the status
of a permanent Security Council member, to legitimize its military presence
outside its borders, and to boost its political and military potential. In
pursuing its long-term policy in the Balkans, after the initial strong-arm
tactic in pursuit of recognition, Germany sought to act unobtrusively. Slowly
but surely it ensured its "presence" in the former Yugoslavia: it has
become a member of the Contact Group, took part in the Rapid Reaction Force,
and its representative was installed in Mostar as EU administrator. German
foreign policy became strongly Balkan-oriented in the late 1980s. According to
the recollections of General Veljko Kadijevic, former Defense Minister of SFR
Yugoslavia, in the last few years before the country’s break-up the German
military attaché in Belgrade did not conceal his extremely negative stand on
Yugoslavia. He permitted himself such liberties as saying that "Yugoslavia
does not exist", referring to "Serb swine," asserting that "the
best Serb is a dead Serb" and adding, in case there remained any doubt as
to his sympathies, that he "cannot bear the sight of a single Serb."
/1/. This was merely a crude but accurate indicator of the growing mood in
Bonn; and when in 1991 the United States left it to the EC to try and settle
the nascent conflict, "Germany launched an open offensive on all fronts:
political, economical and military" /2/. Germany's
strategic goals in the Balkans presupposed the inclusion of Croatia and
Slovenia in its economic zone, providing it with the control of major
international crossroads and ensuring it a direct access to the Adriatic and
the Mediterranean, as well as an extended section of the Danube valley. If the corrolary of such policy was the
single-minded support for Bosnia’s Moslems, its welcome consequence was the
favorable disposition towards Germany of its chief oil and gas suppliers in the
Arab world. Germany’s insistence on the international recognition of
Bosnia-Herzegovina as a Moslem-dominated “multiethnic” state had a geostrategic
logic based on its decision-makers’ perception of their country’s best
interests. The same logic prompted Germany to support Croatia, to supply funds
and arms for its separation, to protect it from sanctions regardless of its
crimes, and to spur on to military actions. The United States switched over, during
the last decade, from seeking consensus with its friends and allies to imposing
its will - on them as well as on its perceived foes - from the position of
strength. The U.S. rediscovery of fist-banging in the complicated system of
international relations was explained by some proponents of such new
assertiveness as its return to the road of global international relations /note
3/. Several
commentators have found America’s explicit anti-Serb bias hard to understand;
but the fact is undeniable. According to a veteran New York Times journalist
with long Balkan experience, David Binder, the U.S. has long had a strategy of
Serbia's political, economic and military isolation. That concept, he claims,
included inducements to political and even military co-operation between
Bosnian Moslems, Albanians, Macedonians and Croats. His conclusion is that the
U.S. policy was aimed at reducing Serbia to the lowest possible level as a
factor in the Balkans /4/. There are several possible explanations for the
anti-Serb edge of Washington’s policy. Regardless of their relative weight,
those reasons are a result of deliberate policy choices of certain
policy-making elites in Washington, and not a result of some "error,"
or “misunderstanding.” Some motives
worth exploring are as follows: 1. The
desire to exploit the break-up of former Yugoslavia as a legal, political and
military-strategic precedent for the break-up of the former USSR. 2. Support
rendered for the Bosnian Moslems was supposed to prove that the USA do not have
an a priori anti-Moslem bias. 3. As a
result of increased demand for arms by newly-fangled U.S. clients in the
Balkans, the U.S. military-industrial complex has been given a welcome boost. On
a broader front, it is important to revive the image of a looming enemy in the
East. 4. The
Serbs are a soft target, and humbling them was a low-cost foreign policy
success, welcome in the run-up to last November’s election. 5. The
desire to redefine and strengthen the political role of the U.S. in Europe:
Washington has taken steps to convince its partners that not only the
Yugoslavs, but also the Europeans in general, can never cope with their
problems without the U.S. 6. By
extending the role of NATO to the Balkans the U.S. has revitalized an ailing
organization, confirmed its leadership within it, and laid ground for an
eventual expansion of NATO eastwards. Since
late 1989 the foreign powers-that-be had dramatically increased their
involvement in the developments in Yugoslavia. /5/ Germany and the U.S. agreed on the need for a major realignment
in the area, including the break-up of the YPA which nominally still ranked as
one of the most powerful armies of Europe. Any attempt to revive the traditionally
close Serbo-Russian relations was to be resisted. All that could be attained by
the break up of the South Slav state in the western Balkans. On the other hand, a mix of economic and political
goals may help explain the imposition of unprecedentedly cruel and
long-extended sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro (the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia), the state which did not take part in the conflict. Economic ruin
is the precondition for political vulnerability and dependence. Yugoslav bank
accounts in western banks remain partly blocked, and the “outer wall” of
sanctions is still in place. If one were to look for one reason which carries
greater weight than other, then it must concern NATO. The Balkans were the
testing ground for changes which were to be introduced in the Alliance’s role
and functions. A new place was to be found for it in Europe and the world, and
a new justification for its "peace-keeping" activity. One may pinpoint the following important spheres in the U.S.
"Balkan" activity; a) the imposition
of its own viewpoints in the negotiation process; b) alteration
of NATO's role, and the construction of a legal basis for its participation in
the "peace-keeping" processes in the Balkans; c) orchestration
of the disinformation campaign, a veritable anti-Serb media blitz which served
as a confirmation of the “just” nature of the U.S. policy; d) neutralization
of Russia’s role and presence in the Balkans. It is
beyond the scope of this paper to deal with any of these aspects except rather
fleetingly: The
United States' active intervention in the negotiation
process in Bosnia-Herzegovina dates back to January 1993, and is associated
with the change of administration. Just
a few days after Bill Clinton was sworn in, David Owen - who was trying to devise
a peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina - was informed that the President did not
intend to support the ICFY peace plan. It soon turned out that, far from
supporting it, the United States were going to sabotage that plan. On
February 10, 1993 the Clinton Administration made public its own plan for the
settlement of the conflict in the Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was tantamount to
the adoption by the United States of an active policy in the Balkans, and ipso facto in Europe as a whole. Apart
from other things, the plan provided for more drastic sanctions to be applied
against Serbia, for coordination of the United Nations activity with NATO, and
for possible use of force /6/. Even that plan was viewed by the Bosnian Moslems as
insufficiently tough and decisive; we can only speculate whether it was of
their own accord, or upon discrete prompting from Washington, that they asked
the U.S. to bring its troops into Bosnia. /7/ The new U.S. assertiveness,
coupled with the public request of the “legal” government of Bosnia, made the
prospect of NATO forces’ engagement in action more likely. An alliance created
in order to deter the alleged Soviet threat was finally gearing up for a fight
with some million and a half Serbs west of the Drina! The
United States started pushing its “peace plans” with customary Yankee energy -
by force and without heed to the interests of the conflicting parties. Such
policy was crowned by the Dayton Agreement, which came as a result of NATO's
U.S.-led military pressure, and one-sided U.S. political activity. The net
result is the reintroduction of bullying and Diktat as a norm, rather than discretely applied exception, in
international relations. Parallel
to this, a mighty media campaign was
initiated even before the first shots were fired. In 1991 in the territory of
Yugoslavia, and later in Europe and the world, a veritable information
Blitzkrieg was waged against the Serbs, in which they were thoroughly defeated
long before their positions were bombed by NATO. As David Owen - certainly not
a Serbs’ friend - pointed out, the media war, with its distortions and
propaganda masquerading as news, was an essential ingredient of the overall
design. /8/ The
main goal of the media was to establish a number of stereotype ideas and bring
them home to the readership, audiences, and the political figures. Many
atrocity stories, carried by the media throughout North America and Europe -
even Russia was also among them in 1991-1992 - were based on reprints and
second-hand accounts of reports by other, mostly American, news sources (eg. New York Newsday’s mass-rape
fabrications, for which its author, Roy Gutman, got a Pulitzer!). I will name
but a few of the stereotype ideas which have been successfully spread among the
public. 1. The
nascent conflict was portrayed as a struggle between democracy (Slovenia,
Croatia) and a Communist dictatorship (Serbia, rump Yugoslavia). Hence the
obvious conclusion: democracy should be supported, for the West has been always
its advocate. 2. To
depict the federal leaders as orthodox Communists, and consequently the last
bulwark of Communism which had to be destroyed. 3. An
image of one party, allegedly responsible for the conflict, should be
constructed and then gradually transformed into enemy image. 4. The
next step was to prepare a pretext for punishing the aggressor. So the media have made their
contribution. Those who visited the UN mission in former Yugoslavia as a rule
held several basic prejudices, formed either under the influence of the press
or in accordance with their states' assignments. At least most soldiers on the ground remained
mercifully impervious to such distortions. Several UNPROFOR commanders
succeeded each other in the years of blue helmets activity in the Balkans.
Curiously enough, almost all of them left their position before expiration of
term, and all of them ended up by criticizing the UN mission. When they came to
former Yugoslavia many officials of international organizations found quite a
different picture on the spot than that presented by media. They soon came to
realize that the situation was not so simple after all, that it was not the
Serbs who were the only guilty party, that the powers-that-be are not motivated
solely by the policy of peace and good intentions, and that the concept of
justice and equal treatment of the parties to the conflict were not applicable
to the UN policy in the Balkans. Moreover, honest diplomats and military officers
could witness the biased attitude of the leading officials who controlled the
peace-keeping operations, which was manifested in the brazenly selective
treatment of information. They witnessed the routine manipulation of facts in
order to make them confirm the ready-made formula of the Serbs' guilt. That is
why some of them left their posts before the expiration of the mandate, while
others made their confessions after the expiration of their term by granting
interviews or publishing memoirs and recollections. Thus
Yasushi Akashi was undoubtedly a witness to many forgeries and absurdities.
After he left the UN mission, he, for instance, openly declared that the Serbs
had nothing to do with the 1994 explosion on the Markale market. Ian
Saegers, a Belgian colonel who was a member of the UN observation mission in
Sarajevo, Bihac and Western Slavonia, also published his recollections. Colonel
Saegers believes that, among the victims of the military drama in former
Yugoslavia, one should include many honest and independent observers, whose
duty was to watch the developments and act as honest brokers. And yet, they had
to listen to hypocritical statements and distortions, and even tacitly condone
them, while feeling helpless and prevented from telling the truth. Col. Saegers
cited several examples of such deceit - arms deliveries for Croats and Moslems,
espionage activities in favor of Croatia at the Zagreb headquarters, and false
accusations against Serbs on “ethnic cleansing.” /9/ There are many such
stories yet to be told. When I worked at the Zagreb UN headquarters I witnessed
several cases of distorting facts in the Moslems' favor. Yasushi
Akashi was severely criticized by the US side whenever he failed to fulfill
their orders. One may recall that in the summer of 1994 the U.S. ambassador at
the U.N., Mrs. M. Albright, openly expressed her dissatisfaction with Akashi,
stressing that he should know “whose money pays his salary.” In June 1995
Washington angrily reacted to Akashi's letter, sent to the leadership of the
Republic of Srpska, in which he promised that the Rapid Reaction Force would
act exclusively in accordance with the UNPROFOR mandate and with its
peace-keeping mission. Nicholas Burns, the State Department spokesman,
reproached Akashi for having sent the letter without preliminary consultations
with the Security Council and the U.S. government. /10/ Burns called the letter
“highly inappropriate” and far removed from the American concept of theon
Force. The U.S. and Russia. The USA could not
but take Russia into account in the process of the elaboration of its Balkan
strategy. Various methods were used to reduce Russia's influence. 1. An
attempt to neutralize Russia by taking advantage of its internal crisis. Prior
to February 1992 Russian policy was marked by noninterference in internal
affairs of Yugoslavia, by its support to SFRY's unity, but in February 1992
Russia made an sharp turn in its appraisal of the developments in Yugoslavia,
it admitted the fact of federation's break-up, but refused to take part in the
crisis settlement. Moscow's passivity made it possible for the Western countries
to build their own system of relations with the former Yugoslav republics.
That's why that period was marked by sharp contradictions in Russia's approach
to the Balkan developments. 2.
An attempt to make
Russia's stand closer to the American one, without necessarily asking for any
concessions or counter-favors. Former Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev
was instrumental in pursuing such policy. The fact is that gradually,
especially after the signing of the Belovezh Agreements in December 1991 and
the break-up of the USSR, and due to absence of the federal mechanism of
elaboration and adoption of decisions on foreign policy issues, decision-making
in the diplomatic field increasingly depended on him personally. 3.
Russian policy-making
establishment was attracted to Europe and the USA by the notions of democracy
and economic prosperity. It apparently believed that the establishment of
friendly relations with the Western countries' leaders would lead to a
conflict-free situation. Moreover, new Russian diplomacy explicitly negated the
aspect of national interest in its foreign policy. Such self-proclaimed absence
of Russian interests in the Balkans was skilfully exploited by Western
diplomacies. Kozyrev agreed on all points with his American counterparts and acted
accordingly. Being wary of Russia's anticipated pro-Serb stand, the West was
quite happy that it had succeeded in attaining "a high degree of harmony
and identity of views" of their approaches to the Yugoslav crisis. In Lord
Owen's opinion, Russia played “a very constructive role” in the diplomatic
process. It did not exercise its right of veto, although Yeltsin was subjected
to considerable pressure by the nationalists. /11/ 4.
Russia had made some
effort in the spring of 1993 to reassert its role, but it turned out that
Moscow was too late to join the process
of crisis settlement after its traditional place had been already occupied. In that period the United States preferred to make
use of Russia in pursuit of its own goals in the Balkans. To be more precise,
the U.S. sought to exploit Moscow’s traditional contacts with the Serbs in
order to pressure the Serb side into maximum concessions. At that time the
Vance-Owen plan for peace in Bosnia was being actively discussed, and it was
necessary to find a side which could exert influence on the “intransigent”
Serbs. That was exactly the time to contact Russia. As has been noted even by
some boldly inclined western media, the West was pinning hopes on Russian-Serb
traditional contacts as a means of implementing Western plans and designs! And so, far from being treated as a “partner” in
the new world order, Moscow was reduced to the status of a tool of western
policy. It was used for the sole purpose of exerting pressure on the Serbs; it
was even allowed to be generous with the promises to the Serb side, but at all
times it was denied any chance of fulfilling them. During the Sarajevo crisis of February 1994 the
contradictory role of Russia was quite obvious: on the one hand, Russia acted
as the carrot, with NATO being the stick. On the other, it was the courage and
devotion of the Russian battalion that may have prevented air strikes against
Serb positions. In response to Russia's pressure the Serbs withdrew heavy
weapons from the Sarajevo region (while the Bosnian-Muslim government did
nothing of the kind) and gave their consent to reopen the airport in Sarajevo
and open the one in Tuzla. Russian
diplomacy showed special zeal in its attempt to make the Serbs give in on the
subject of the Tuzla airport. There are few well-equipped airfields in Bosnia.
The Serbs understood well its strategic importance, and they were adamant that
the Tuzla air base would not under any circumstances be ceded to the UNPROFOR.
Russia's offer to assume control of the airport, confirmed by Andrei Kozyrev,
served as a final argument that influenced the Serbs to make concessions. As the former president of the Republic of Srpska,
Dr. Radovan Karadzic, somewhat naively put it at the time: "We trust
Russia’s unbiased approach. Their presence serves as a guarantee that Moslems
won't receive arms instead of food supplies". The airport was duly opened. Russia was celebrating
what seemed to be an important, albeit rare diplomatic victory; but in reality
it had every reason to grieve over its political oversight. Not a single
Russian promise was realized. Extensive military supplies reached the Moslems
through the Tuzla airport. Furthermore, after Dayton it has become clear that
the U.S. intended to keep Tuzla as its military base. The
U.S. regularly paid lip service to Russia's importance in the crisis
resolution, but it never took Russia's stand into account. Moreover, whenever -
in the view of Washington - Russia dared to go too far in its diplomatic
activity, resolute steps were taken to put it in its “proper” place. For
instance, in Vladivostok, on March 14, 1994, Secretary of State Christopher
subtly intimated to his Russian colleague Kozyrev that the Russian diplomacy
should refrain from making any “excessive fuss” which could jeopardize the
intricate web of compromises woven by Washington’s envoys. He effectively
advised Moscow not to stir things up come what may, and to return to the
blessed time when Russians were invited to talks as “co-sponsors,” -
effectively to take the Americans’ chesnuts out of the fire, if and when
necessary. /12/ More
often than not, Russia was simply not informed about any actions to which
Moscow could react in a manner ill suited to American interests. In February
1994 the ambassadors of three powers - the U.S., Britain and France - visited
the U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and demanded his approval of
the planned air strikes, in total disregard of Russia’s stated position. /13/
In April 1994, yet again, Russia was not informed of the planned air strikes
against Serb positions. According to the Moscow Foreign Ministry statement of
April 11, 1994, "regrettably, Russia was informed antedate about the
decision to use the air power." /14/. This incident even prompted
President Yeltsin to talk to President Clinton. Yeltsin claims that he insisted
that it was unacceptable to make a decision on such issues as striking Serb positions without preliminary
consultations between the US and Russia /15/. Moscow issued sharply worded
warnings to NATO and the U.N. regarding air strikes without prior notice. Evidently, Russia’s verbal assertiveness did not
stir NATO in its determination to launch new air raids. The Westerners
correctly assumed that the Russian president and his foreign minister placed
too much value on Russia's “stable” contacts with Western Europe and the United
States to put them at risk because of the Bosnian Serb “intransigence.” In a TV
interview Kozyrev’s assistant and personal envoy to Pale, Vitaly Churkin, soon
charged the Serbian side with major responsibility for the deteriorating
situation. After talks with the Secretary of State Christopher in late April
1994, Moscow never raised the issue of its opposition to air strikes, and
hurried to assure the public that there existed no disagreements between the US
and Russia. According to Christopher, Boris Yeltsin went out of his way to
assure him that "nobody will succeed in driving a wedge between Russia and
the USA, between him and President Clinton" /16/. The
Big Seven's Halifax decision on Bosnia was adopted in June 1995 without even a
formal consultation with Russia. All decisions had been taken before Yeltsin's
arrival. Illusory as the independence of Russian Balkan policy was, in the
summer of 1995 it vanished into thin air. Having initially been a founding
member of the Contact group, Moscow was not even invited to its session held on
August 3, 1995, as a result of Russia’s publicly stated disapproval of
Croatia's offensive in Western Bosnia. Kremlin sent a protest to the Croatian
president, Franjo Tudjman, and proposed that the Security Council adopt a
resolution condemning Croatia's involvement in the Bosnian conflict. At the London meeting of foreign and defense
ministers and chiefs of staff of the countries which had their peace-keepers in
former Yugoslavia, held two weeks previously, Russia finally acted with
remarkable independence: its representatives went on record (together with the
Ukraine) insisting on a political resolution of the crisis. Owing to Russia's efforts the political conference
in London in July 1995 was not transformed into a military one, and the concept
of resolving the problem by use of force did not prevail at that time.
Therefore, “the West” (under active U.S. gudance) had to resort to the
complicated procedure of NATO's independent activation for the purpose of using
force against the Serbs. The chiefs of staff of Britain, the United States and
France conferred at the MoD in London. In the ensuing week or so the plans of
operations in Bosnia were extensively discussed by NATO representatives. They
adopted them on August 2, having secured the support of Boutros-Ghali, who had
surrendered his powers of veto on the air strikes directly to the NATO
representative and the UNPROFOR commander. Decision-making being transferred to
NATO, Secretary of State Christopher stated with satisfaction that the
agreements thus reached “did not depend on the Russians' approval,” or - more
generally - on Russia’s vote. /17/ Thus
the Balkan crisis has drastically undermined the old international and European
security systems. It has revealed their ineffectiveness and impotence, and it
has instigated a new alignment of forces in the struggle for redrawn spheres of
influence. Russia has been ousted from the zone of its traditional interests, while
the political, economic and military presence of the U.S. and Germany in
South-East Europe have increased enormously. As a consequence, considerable shifts are currently
taking place in Russia, which has been finally forced to re-examine its
national interests. This reappraisal - one hopes - may lead to Russia’s
rediscovery of its proper role as a great power, and enable it to take an
active part in the development of a model of general and all-round security for
Europe in the 21st century. Notes 1. V. Kadijevic, My view of the Break-up, Belgrade: Politika Publications, 1993, p.
25. 2. Ibid., p. 26. 3. Interview
with Lord Owen, ITAR-TASS, “SE” Series, Moscow, June 29, 1993, pp. 21-22. 4. David Binder, The significance of Kosovo for the US and its attitude to the
Yugoslav crisis, Nasa Borba, Belgrade, July 4, 1996, p. 14. 5. Kadijevic, op. Cit., pp. 35-36. 6. US
Agenda for Bosnia, Politika, Belgrade, February 11, 1993, p. 3. 7. Bosnia’s
UN envoy advocates greater U.S. involvement, ITAR/TASS, February 14, 1993. 8. David Owen’s interview with BBC TV’s Panorama,
November 1995. 9. Recollections
of a Belgian Officer, Srbija Bulletin, January 1996, No. 26, pp.
28-30. 10. News
Bulletin, Moscow, January 24, 1995, p. 1. 11. Interview
with Lord Owen, ITAR-TASS: “SE” series, Moscow, April 30, 1993, L7. 12. M. Shipanov, Our triumph against America’s, Kuranti, Moscow, March 23,
1994, p. 3. 13. Our
job not found, Kuranti, Moscow, January 29, 1994, p. 2. 14. Russian Foreign Ministry report, Diplomatic
Gazette, Moscow, 1994, No. 9/10, pg. 63-64. 15. A. Baturin:Moscow outraged by NATO bombing of Bosnian Serbs, Izvestia,
April 12, 1994, p.1 16. Estimates
of cost proven incorrect, Nezavisimaja Gazeta, Moscow, April 22,
1994, p. 2. 17. What does Moscow have in mind?, Pravda, August 12, 1995, pp. 1 & 3.
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